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It is not just about power, but about the type of power - 
relational governance in the context of a transiton economy 






The paper analyses how intermediary’s bargaining power affects relational governance in the context of a transition 
economy, namely the case of Kosovo. There has been limited research and understanding about bargaining power 
and relational governance in developing and transition economies. Multinomial logistic regression is employed to 
investigate the factors affecting relational governance, which is operationalized as categorical variable: 1) Spot 
market transaction, 2) verbal contract and 3) written contract. The results of the study point out that 
intermediaries’ exercised power over farmers affects the farmers’ contracting decisions in different ways. When 
they exercise power over farmers’ margin, it reduces the l ikelihood of farmers’ participation in either verbal or 
written contracts, while power over product quality related activities increases the likelihood of farmers 
engagement in written contracts. Another key finding is that for products that require a spec ific standard and 
quality, written contracts are more likely than verbal ones.   
Keywords: Contract farming, bargaining power, vineyards valu chain.  
1 Introduction  
Agriculture is characterized by high level of uncertainty; the uncertainty looms larger in the case of 
developing or transition countries where farmers face additional challenges related to weak institutional 
framework. Such uncertainty can be caused by inefficient agriculture policy, low access to services, weak 
market structure which characterize typically developing or transition economies. Lack of trust in the 
institutional framework, including courts, discourages farmers from engaging in formal contracts, which is 
a dominating form of value chain coordination in Western/developed countries. Under these conditions, 
spot markets dominate over other types of relational governance. However, market governance is 
associated with high transaction costs when specific investments and uncertainty is high (Williamson, 
1975, 1985). 
Formal arrangements tend to reduce the uncertainty that gives rise to high transaction costs (Poole, et al., 
1998). The use of Contract farming (CF) as a relational governance mechanism to coordinate trading 
relationships between farmers and intermediaries has become increasing ly common practice in the 
developing and developed world. Contract farming generally refers to “agricultural production carried out 
according to an agreement between a buyer and farmers, which establishes conditions for the production 
and marketing of a farm product or products” (FAO, 2013). From a producer perspective, it has been 
shown that CF helps farmers to solve several productivity constraints in the market of insurance, credit, 
information, and high-quality inputs (Grosh, 1994; Key and Runsten, 1999; Katchova and Miranda, 2004). 
Furthermore, there are several studies providing evidence on the positive effects of CF on farmers welfare 
(Singh, 2002; Miyata, et al. 2009; Maertens and Swinnen, 2009; Bellemare, 2012; Wang, et al., 2014). 
From an intermediaries’
*
 perspective, CF helps them to protect their specific investments, get high quality 
and consistent supply and access cheap labour. 
The literature on the motivational factors of smallholders’ participation in CF in developing or transition 
                                                 
*
In this paper the word intermediary refers to all chain agents that stand between the farmer and end consumer.  




countries is growing, but there is no consistency about the effect that various factors have on CF 
participation. Masakure and Henson (2005) argue that these variations between studies reflects countries 
institutional framework as well as socio-economic conditions. While, the lack of consistency on the 
motivational factors appears to be more on farmers demographic and socio -economic characteristics’, in 
the authors view if more fundamental variables related to the contracting decision are considered, one 
could find similarities between studies.  
In this view, this study analysis the motivational factors of smallholder participation in CF (as a form of 
relational governance) by employing the transaction cost economics (TCE) theory as one of the most 
prominent theoretical perspectives in the study of governance arrangements. In addition, we add to the 
theory the concept of intermediaries’ bargaining power as an instrument that would motivate farmers to 
contract. Yet, this is not considered in the fundamental TCE framework since it is assumed that possessing 
bargaining power gives to a trading party options on how to govern the trading relationship. This 
would/could be true when power is considered as whole but if one considers that power is 
multidimensional, each dimension might have different effects on an outcome (here is CF) and when the 
sum of the effects is considered they might cancel out. Thus, the contribution of this study is threefold. 
First, we contribute to the literature on CF and relational governance by prov iding a model that would be 
consistent even when replicated to other conditions. Moreover, we also explore the differences between 
verbal contracts and written ones, whereas the literature on CF looks only at CF -vs-spot market 
transactions. Second, we contribute to the development policy literature by showing how to develop 
sustainable and successful CF schemes. Lastly, we contribute to the TCE theory by adding the concept of 
power to its fundamental framework as an instrument to improve its predictability.  
This study is based on a vinyards farm survey in Kosovo, which is situated in the Western Balkans. Almost 
half of the population still lives in rural areas. Kosovo had a centrally planned economy under Yugoslavia 
until the early 1990s. Kosovo emerged as an independent country after the notorious conflict of the late 
1990ies. The conflict resulted in human and economic losses – the agrifood sector and the vineyards 
specifically were damaged. During planned economy as well as transition, agriculture has been one of the 
main economic sectors of Kosovo in terms of contribution to GDP and has always been a key sector for 
growing the economy of Kosovo. In terms of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and jobs, agriculture is an 
important sector in Kosovo's economy. Agriculture also provides the largest employment opportunities 
amongst others sectors in post-war Kosovo - according to results of the Agriculture Census 2015, there are 
130,775 agricultural households, employing 86.620 people with full -time jobs (KAS, 2015). 
After the conflict, there was growing attention by private business, government, and donors for the 
agriculture sector in general, and vineyard and wine specifically, which resulted in growth and renewed 
investments. Grape production is concentrated in the region of Rahovec (more than 4/5 of the national 
production) while almost 3/4 of the grape production is destined for wine-making. Wine production is 
growing and have been and remain among the main agri-food sectors in Kosovo in terms of production 
and international trade since wine is one of the most exported agri -food products (FAO, 2015; Zhllima et 
al, 2020).  
Kosovo has been facing the challenges of strengthening institutions, adapting to free market economy 
demands, and attracting investments. The agri-food sector as a whole is facing problems with creating 
market institutions, establishing marketing and distribution chains, meeting EU food safety, veterinary 
and phitosanitary standards, and building the administrative capacity to suppor t these processes. The 
agrifood value chain is expected to change substantially in the coming years and the competition from 
neighbouring countries will increase in the context of regional and EU integration.  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the study framework and 
hypotheses. In section 3, the methodology of the study is presented. Section 4, shows the results of the 
analysis, which are discussed in section 5 and provides conclusions.  
2 Study framework 
While there are several theories that have been used to explain CF (see Prowse, 2012), the most 
developed body of work is transaction cost economics. Williamson (1975, 1985) developed the TCE 
framework, which emphasizes that the decision on how to govern a relationship i s principally determined 
by differences in transaction cost. Williamson (1975, 1985) demonstrated, how asset specificity, 
uncertainty and transaction frequency relate to transaction costs. The fundamental tenets of TCE theory is 
that firms will tend to integrate in the presence of high uncertainty, large specific investments and 
frequent transactions. The reason being that under these circumstances the transaction costs are higher 
in trading relationships governed by spot market transaction then in hierarch ies (i.e. vertical integration 
or contracting). Following this perspective Minot (2007, p.1) outlines that since contracting involves costs, 
“it is economically justifiable only when the buyer is a large firm (a processor, exporter, or supermarket 





Here the other elements of TCE theory (i.e., uncertainty and transaction frequency) are not modeled 
because for the context of the study it was not possible to operationalize them. Yet, to account indirectly 
for the market uncertainty the extent of farmers access to information is entered the model. The link 
between the two is that uncertainty raise when the information is limited and vice versa. Thus, when 
farmers have access to market information they should face less uncertainty , which based on the TCE 
theory leads to a lower likelihood of participation in CF. Moreover, those farmers that have access to 
information (e.g. about market, buyers etc.) might prefer to be flexible, and keep the options open in 
terms of choice of buyer (type, location, timing),  rather than bind him/herself into a contract. While, on 
the other hand, farmers who lack information, are assumed to perceive higher uncertainty and engage in 
contracting to reduce that.  In this context, the following proposition is made:   
Hypothesis 1: Farmers’ specific investment and intermediaries’ specific investment are positively related to 
contract farming, while farmers access to market information is negatively related.  
Bargaining power is not considered in the TCE theory as an element that would affect how trading relationships 
are governed because the mode of governance is selected after transaction costs are incurred, while power is 
an ex-ant element that gives option to the one possessing it. The argument stands as long as power is 
conceptualized as a uni-dimensional variable. However, as argued by Xhoxhi, et al., (2014) power is a 
multidimensional variable and extends across a wide range of activities, such as margin-related activities, 
product-related activities, delivery related activities, etc. Assuming that power is a uni-dimensional variable, 
bias may be introduced into the analysis in favor of one activity over another. 
In this view, it can be shown through a game theory perspective that different ways of exercising 
intermediaries’ power could have different outcomes (for this study context –CF vs spot market 
transaction). By employing simple game theory, let consider a one-shot game (i.e., prisoners dilemma), 
where it is assumed that point A in (table 1) is spot-market transaction and point D is contract farming. 
The other two points are unattainable, thus are not considered. The assumption is based on the evidence 
from the literature on CF about its beneficial effects for both trading parties (Maertens and Swinnen, 
2009; Miyata, et al., 2009; Bellemare, 2012). Thus, the intermediary considers what the farmer can do and 
decides to exploit his power to extract better margins from the farmer. From both scenarios of the table, 
the one that maximises the intermediary gains is to exploit his power (i.e., if the farmer cheats and the 
intermediary does not use his power the intermediary gets 2 but if the intermediary exploits his power 
the intermediary gets 5, on the other hand if the farmer does not cheat and the intermediary does not 
exploit his power the intermediary gets 10 but if he uses his power the intermediary gets 15). The same 
rational is also true for the farmer, he (i.e. the farmer) would chose to cheat (e.g. by placing perished 
products or bad products at the end of the basket). So, the chosen scenario is (A) which is a Nash 
equilibrium. Nevertheless, there is a global equilibrium (i.e. pareto equilibrium) that has higher returns for 
both, but it is not possible to achieve and not stable to sustain.  
                                            Table 1 Farmer’s and intermediary’s dilemma A  
         
Note: The values in brackets () is what the farmers gets, without () is what intermediary gets 
We can assume that the intermediary has another option of power beside power to affect farmers’ 
margin. For example, he can exercise power over input selection or production process or harvesting and 
delivery activities, in other words power that influences farmers’ way of production with the aim to 
improve product quality, which the intermediary can sell for a higher price and can make up the profit lost 
from not using power over margin. 
In this case the intermediaries’ choice (table 2) in the scenario that the farmer does not cheat provides 
him (intermediary) the same return. Yet, also in this case the farmer will still chose to cheat because it’s 
the alternative that gives him the highest return after considering what the intermediary can do. Thus, 
also in this case the solution of the game is (A).  
                                    Table 2 Farmer’s and intermediary’s dilemma B 
Options Farmer 
Intermediary Cheats Does not cheat 
Exercises power over margin (A) 5, (5) (B) 15, (2) 
Options                       Farmer 
Intermediary Cheats Does not cheat 
Exercises power over margin (A) 5, (5) (B) 15, (2) 
Does not exercise Power over margin (C) 2, (15) (D) 10, (10) 




Exercise power over activities to improve product quality (C) 2, (15) (D) 15, (10) 
Note: The values in brackets () is what the farmers gets, without () is what intermediary gets 
Until now the focus was on a one-time game, but if repeated games format is considered (which is more 
realistic), the result will change. In case a farmer cheats, he would lose that relationship and next year it 
will be more difficult to sell his production because the other buyers will have some information about his 
opportunistic behaviour. Under these circumstances, the farmer will think about the long -term 
profitability of the relationship regarding the merit of one-time cheating. In the long run, the profitability 
of the relationship for the farmer will be much higher than his cheating the current year. Therefore, he 
would choose not to cheat. In this situation, the intermediary is indifferent regarding his choice, but 
considering the long-run profitability he would also choose not to exercise power over margin because 
that might ruin the relationship. The solution of this game would be (D in table 2 which refers to CF 
option) and is a win-win game, where both parties stand to gain. Following this discussion, it i s 
hypothesised that: 
Hypothesis 2: Intermediaries’ exercise of power over farmers’ margin decreases the likelihood of farmers 
CF participation. 
Hypothesis 3: Intermediaries’ exercise of power over farmers’ product quality related activities increases 
the likelihood of farmers CF participation.  
The objective of the written contract is not only to serve as a guarantee for the parties – especially in the 
case of transition countries such as Kosovo, with weak law enforcement. The distrust in the courts (and 
law enforcement institutions) is expected to discourage formal contracting. In the case of weak 
institutional enforcement, farmers often prefer informal and self -enforcing arrangements (Bouis and 
Haddad, 1990; Jabbar et al., 2008). Williamson (1979) reflects  directly on ‘relational contracting’ stating 
that an alternative choice to (formal) contracting is (informal) relational contracting which is ‘a ‘socially 
enforceable’ contract rather than by formal rules and hierarchy’. In the case of Albania (neighborin g and 
similar country with Kosovo) most farmers are found to consider that informal contracts are more 
enforceable than formal ones (Imami et al., 2013). Thus, written contracts become indispensable (and 
irreplaceable by informal agreements), when there is a need to have detailed/codified information related 
to product attributes, such as standards or characteristics, which thereby should be clearly written (to 
avoid misunderstanding or to remind the parties) – such information is unlikely to be remembered 
accurately if it is not written. In the case when only price and/or volumes should be agreed, that can be 
done orally; but when different standard specification or characteristics are required, and when price is 
differentiated according to them (thus, when there is not one unique price), it is necessary to have that 
explained and agreed in a written way. This could be particularly the case for grape destined for wine 
processing, since the characteristics of the grape when harvested can greatly influence win e quality (thus 
it is necessary to clearly state the characteristics of the harvested grape). Thereby, it is hypothesized that:  
Hypothesis 4: Farmers’ producing wine grapes are more likely to engage in written contracts than farmers’ 
producing table grapes.  
Hypothesis 5: Intermediaries’ exercise of power over farmers’ product quality related activities leads more 
to written contracts than verbal ones. 
3 Methodology 
The structured survey was designed in 2015 and finalized by 2016. The survey was conducted in the 
Rahovec region, where most grape production is concentrated. The survey consisted of direct face -to-face 
interviews conducted by trained graduate students. In total 222 vineyard farmers were interviewed of 
which 105 specialized in table grapes. 
The dependent variable of this study is contract participation which was operationalized with three 
categories 1) no agreement, 2) verbal agreement and 3) written contract. To analyze the determinants 
affecting CF, multinomial logistic regression is employed, the results are presented in table 6. 
The variables of the model explaining CF: 1) Intermediaries’ power over farmers’ margin  related activities 
(POM), 2) Intermediaries’ power over farmers’ product quality related activities (POQ) and 3) Farmers’ 
access to information are latent variables and are operationalized through Likert scale statements ranging 
from one to five (level of influence for the statements relating to the power variables and level of 
agreement for the statements relating to the access of information variable) and measures for them were 
developed using exploratory factor analysis. 
To derive measures of power, eight activities important to farmers’ business were chosen based on a 
series of semi-structured interviews with farmers, literature review and discussions with key informants of 
the supply chain. These activities were: Pesticides selection, fertilizer selection, the way the product is 




harvested, the time when it is harvested, the way it delivered, price to the intermediary, payment terms  
of the intermediary, and total payment of the intermediary. The extent of intermediary influence was 
captured for each activity by using a five-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (no influence) to 5 (major 
influence). To get our measure of power, the level of intermediary influence for each activity was 
multiplied by a weight of the perceived level of importance of the activity to the farmer. This level of 
importance of each activity to the farmer was also measured using a Likert scale (1 no importance to,  5 
major importance). The main reason of multiplying the influence level by the importance of the activity to 
the farmer was to get the directional element of power. Power is not just influence, it is influence in a 
direction that favours the one who exercised it (intermediary) but in this direction, the one who power 
was exercised over (farmer) would not have freely tended. In this context, one can exercise influence 
without exercising power. This method of deriving a measure of the power variable was used  by El-Ansary 
and Stern (1972), Collins (2002 and 2007), Xhoxhi,  et al., (2014). 
As it is shown from EFA using principal component applied to the items of intermediaries’ power and 
farmers’ access to information revealed 3 factors (table 3).  
  Table 3 Reliability and Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) of study latent variables 
 α F1 F2 F3 
F1) Power over product quality related activities (POQ) 
.856    
how much influence the major buyer of the product has on the 
Decision how the product is harvested   .846   
how much influence the major buyer of the product has on the 
Decision on what pesticides/herbicides to   .790   
how much influence the major buyer of the product has on the 
Decision on what fertilizers to use  .768   
how much influence the major buyer of the product has on the 
Decision how the product is delivered  .712   
use how much influence the major buyer of the product has on the 
Decision when the product is harvested  .711   
F2) Farmers’ access to information 
.874    




 .901  
To what extent can you obtain the information required to understand 
buyers needs   .862  
To what extent can you obtain the information about market 
requirements about the product quality and standards   .751  
To what extent can you obtain the information about products price 
  .736  
F3) Power over margin (POM) 
.840    
how much influence the major buyer of the product has on the 
Decision on the Price of the product 
 
 
  .886 
how much influence the major buyer of the product has on the 
determination of the payment terms to the buyer (e.g. payment delay)     .885 
how much influence the major buyer of the product has on the 
Decision on the amount to be paid for the product    .833 
Note: Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization  
These factors explain the structure of the data set accounting for 68.5% of the total variation. Barlett’s 
test of sphericity ( = 1262: df=66; P<.000) and the KMO test of sampling adequacy (.726) confirm the 




appropriateness of the factor analysis (Field, 2009). All factor loadings are well in excess of Stevens (2002) 
recommended value of .40, providing evidence of constructs convergent validity. Factor 1 (F 1) represents 
intermediaries’ exercised Power Over farmers product Quality related activities (POQ), factor 2 (F2) 
farmers access to information and factor 3 (F3) intermediaries’ exercised Power Over farmers’ Margin 
related activities (POM). The Chronbach’s α value for all constructs exceeds the cut-off value of .70, giving 
evidence of constructs reliability (Nunally, 1981). Lastly, to get the measures of each variable, composites 
were generated from the EFA using the regression method. 
Another condition that the variables must satisfy to be considered valid is that of discriminant validity 
which referes to the level of variable uniques (i.e. not correlated with the other factors). Evidence for is 
this can bee seen in table 3, where each of the item loads strongly only on its factor and it does not 
crossload on the other ones. 
4 Empirical research findings   
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
As Table 4 shows, market relations for the vineyard sector are mostly regulated through verbal 
agreements. Verbal agreements are implemented in 47.7% of the cases, followed by written contracts 
with 32.4% and no agreement at all (spontaneous selling) with 19.8%.  
Development of personal trust is especially related with the frequency of market exchange. As transaction 
costs theory suggest, in the case of recurrent transactions, transaction partners become more familiar 
with each other (importance of trust) and with the products transacted, creating routines. This directly 
results in a decrease of the transaction costs and will also moderate the tendency to behave 
opportunistically (Williamson, 1975). The results of this study show that about half of the farmers do not 
sell to the same buyer consistently (Table 5).  
                                     Table 4 Farmers’ relation s with main buyers 
 Frequency Percent 
Relations with main 
buyers (contract) 
Written contract 72 32.4 
Verbal agreement 106 47.7 
No agreement 44 19.8 
Total 222 100 
Relations with main 
buyers (timespan): 
Daily 81 37.5 
Several weeks 16 7.4 
Several months 51 23.6 
More than a year 68 31.5 
Total 216 100 
          
Source: Field survey and own calculations 
                                        Table 5 Trading partners for three sectors 
Do you usually sell to same buyer?  
Frequency Percent 
Same buyers 113 50.9 
Different buyers 109 49.1 
Total 222 100.0 
         
 Source: Field survey 
About 51% of vineyard cultivators report that they trade with the same partner, whereas 49% report to 
trade with different partners.  
4.2 Model explaining contract participation  
Table 6 shows the factors that affect both written and verbal agreement compared to the reference 
category of no agreement. As can be seen the raised hypotheses are supported, aside hypothesis one for 
which we don’t find any significant effects of farmers’ access to market information and vineyard size on 












Wald Sig. Exp(B) Hyp. 
Verbal 
agreement 
Intercept -2.137 1.913 1.247 .264   
Farmers’ age .008 .018 .211 .646 1.008  
Farmers’ Educ. years -.073 .079 .853 .356 .929  
Farm size .178 .137 1.702 .192 1.195  
Vineyard Size -.429 .580 .547 .459 .651 H1 
Table versus wine grapes .922 .600 2.357 .125 2.514 H4 
Processor channel 1.950 .892 4.773 .029 7.027 H1 
Retail channel .359 .557 .416 .519 1.432 H1 
Farmers’ access to info. .254 .232 1.193 .275 1.289 H1 
POQ .290 .252 1.323 .250 1.336 H3; H4 
POM -.920 .248 13.754 .000 .399 H2 
Specialization 5.197 2.025 6.589 .010 180.72 H1 
Written 
contract 
Intercept -5.396 2.416 4.988 .026   
Farmers’ age .007 .025 .081 .776 1.007  
Farmers’ Educ. years -.046 .092 .256 .613 .955  
Farm size .071 .186 .145 .704 1.074  
Vineyard Size .070 .643 .012 .914 1.072  H1 
Table versus wine grapes 1.740 .745 5.453 .020 5.698  H4 
Processor channel 3.306 .957 11.941 .001 27.270 H1 
Retail channel -1.550 .959 2.612 .106 .212 H1 
Farmers’ access to info. -.319 .283 1.263 .261 .727 H1 
POQ .595 .312 3.640 .056 1.812 H3; H4 
POM -1.065 .319 11.169 .001 .345 H2 
Specialization 6.797 2.199 9.555 .002 895.24 H1 
Note: The reference category is: No agreement;
 
Chi-Square (162.4 on 22 df); Cox and Snell = .527; Nagelkerke .601; McFadden .358  
5 Discussion of the results and conclusions 
This article explores the relational governance and power between farmers and intermediaries, by viewing 
relational governance from as a choice between three options 1) spot market transaction, 2) 
informal/verbal agreement and 3) formal written contract. The study findings show that there are a 
number of factors that affect in a similar way both verbal and written agreements. Starting with 
specialization, the more the farmers are specialized in the vineyard production the higher their likeliho od 
to engage in either verbal or written CF (hypothesis 1). As discussed above specialization is a part of 
farmers specific investment, on the other hand, we do not find any effect of vineyard size, which is the 
other side of the farmers specific investments on contract participation. The policy implication of this 
result is that, any initiative that aims to promote contract farming, during the screen process of the 
candidates (farmers) that are going to be part of scheme, should consider their level of spe cialization in 




the product rather than the size of the farm (or cultivated area).  
Furthermore, the channel that the farmers use to sell their produce appears to have a similar effect, those 
who sell to processors are more likely to participate in verbal/written CF. On the other hand, framers 
selling through the retail channel appear to have no differences in the mode of governance compared to 
farmers selling to wholesaler.  
Whereas, Intermediaries’ exercise of their power over farmers’ margins tends to dis courage participation 
in both types of agreements. It is well documented that there is considerable power asymmetry between 
farmers and intermediaries. This power asymmetry is especially problematic when intermediaries attempt 
to “squeeze” farmers margin, which compromises their business and livelihood (Xhoxhi, et al., 2014). In 
this context, when developing a contracting schemes policy makers and development agency can be part 
of the process of contract setup and should play the part of an honest broker, t o build trust between the 
parties and avoid the development of contracts that favor the party that has more power. In doing so, 
they can act also as a moderator or arbitrator in case of contract dispute, since access to the judicial 
system is costly and considerably difficult to be accessed by small farmers.  
Although, there are a number of factors that affect in the same way verbal and written contracts, it 
appears that two variables have different effects on each of them, namely 1) type of cultivated grape s 
(table grapes VS wine grapes) and 2) intermediaries’ exercise of power over farmers’ product quality 
related activities (POQ). These variables affect significantly participation in written contracts but have no 
effect on participation in verbal ones. Intermediaries POQ power dimensions results to increase farmers’ 
participation in written contracts, while it has no effect on verbal contract. This points out, that written 
contract require higher product quality than verbal agreements and to achieve this, i ntermediaries 
exercise more power over farmers product quality related activities. Moreover, written contracts are 
more likely for wine grapes than table grapes which is in line with hypothesis 4.  
The results of the study point out that intermediaries’ exercised power over farmers affects the 
contracting decisions in different ways. When they exercise power over farmers margin it reduces the 
likelihood of farmers’ participation in CF, while power over product quality related activities increases the 
likelihood of farmers engagement in written contracts. These results add to the existing literature on 
contract farming in two ways: first by providing insights on how intermediaries’ power on farmers 
contracting decisions in a developing country context (to the best or authors knowledge research 
addressing this issue is limited) and second, by developing a multi item scale to measure intermediaries’ 
power dimensions.  
Furthermore, the study contributes to the development policy literature by pointing out that no t all 
intermediaries power is negative to farmers business. While, power over margins is problematic and 
affects negatively farmers business and livelihood, power over product quality related activities could lead 
to win-win trading relationship between farmers and intermediaries. In this view, when considering rural 
development, development policies should not only look at the farmers’ level, but should focus also on 
the intermediaries by changing their way of doing business (moving from power over margin to power 
over product quality related activities). In the authors view, if intermediaries shift from POM to POQ, it 
would have beneficial effect not only for the farmer intermediary stage but for the whole chain and 
country development.  
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